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Within this study we propose different measures to prove the influence of prior retail 
fund performance on fund flows. In contrast to previous literature, our work indicates 
that investors behave directly and in a selective manner by redeeming their shares of 
poor performing funds. By using a large data set of 1672 retail funds in Germany from 
March 2008 to April 2010 we are able to underscore that in general, both the prior 
performance of funds and the prior net redemptions have a statistically significant 
influence on outflows of funds. Moreover, it seems likely that investors react faster to 
market signals by withdrawing their shares in crisis situations than in previous decades 
that might be due to lower cost of information. Our findings can serve as a warning 
signal for policy-makers, regulatory authorities and the fund industry to establish a 
strong regulatory framework to prevent liquidity shortages of retail funds. 
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1. Introduction 
The focus of discussions during the economic crisis starting in 2008 was centered 
primarily on the destruction of capital in global stock markets as opposed to less 
important retail fund markets that have not been taken into account thus far.
1 Although 
an increased number of retail clients were investing for the purposes of wealth building 
                                                           
1 In February 2011 the volume of retail fund markets in Germany were about 342.3 billion € in total. The biggest 
portion was accounted for equity funds (33.74%). Fixed income funds covered 16.26%, balanced funds 6.89% and 
money market funds 2.56% of total market volume. (Kapitalmarktstatistik der Bundesbank [2011]). Besides, open 
real estate funds counted a portion of 25.48%. For further research on open real estate funds see Sebastian and Tyrell 
(2006). - 2 - 
 
and retirement security, these markets paid little attention by researchers in the past, 
particularly concerning the regulation of retail fund markets and investors’ behavior. In 
response to financial market crises, there has been a strong increase in research 
concerning incentive structures of individuals in financial markets (see e.g. Chevalier 
and Ellison [1997] or Diamond and Rajan [2009a]). In addition, the number of 
contributions to literature on contagion effects within financial industries increased. As 
a result, financial market instability is often thought to be connected with strategic 
`herding` behavior of investors who react depending on decisions of other investors, 
even if their decisions are not rational.
2 The model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
offers a standard framework for such investors’ behavior in financial markets and 
examines withdrawal of bank deposits by panicky consumers who lose confidence in 
the stability of their bank. Following Diamond and Dybvig, the problem of self-
fulfilling, pessimistic expectations can be solved by deposit insurance. However, this 
leads to a moral hazard problem, as banks will show an increased appetite for risk 
knowing that their risks are covered by deposit insurance.
3 Concerning retail fund 
markets, there are a number of publications focusing on specific fund segments, 
however they disregard the risks of correlations between different fund categories and 
subsequent aggregate fund flows that may be the result of self-fulfilling pessimistic 
expectations under crisis situations.
4 
 In  contemporary  research, the relationship between net flows and fund performance 
is described in different ways.
5 Early papers develop a positive linear connection but 
further research has proven a non-linear relationship between net flows and past 
performance (Chevalier and Ellison [1995] or Gruber [1996]). However, most 
researchers hold the opinion of a basically positive correlation between performance 
                                                           
2 If incentive of an individual increases to carry out a certain action which he expects other investors will also make, a 
domino effect will follow. For further information see Morris and Shin (1998) or Abreau and Brunnermeier (2003). 
3 A large literature has been concentrating on this topic and examines the Diamond and Dybvig approach (see e.g. 
Morris and Shin [1998] or Abreau and Brunnermeier [2003]). Jacklin (1987) for example extends the model to an 
economy in which banks appear simultaneous to financial markets.  Engineer (1989) develops a Diamond-Dybvig 
model with four periods and shows that in the long run, the suspension of convertibility with a bank run promises no 
success.  More present research places the focus stronger on contagion effects. Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et 
al. (2000) for example extend the Diamond-Dybvig model by focusing on the dependence of different financial 
institutions and with that aggregated risk potentials. 
4 Warther (1995) for example delves into the specifically study of behavior of aggregate fund flows. Edelen and 
Warner (1999) consider the effects of past performance on return of mutual funds. Sebastian and Tyrell (2006) show 
that a run on shares of a fund does not always have to be ineffective. Rather it can also come to a market cleaning, so 
that wrong management of retail funds is punished and a market cleaning is given. They see rather the moral hazard 
problem in connection with efficient markets as an important focus and in this respect consider regulatory 
intervention, as postulated by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), more critically. 
5 Net flows are calculated from the difference between inflows and outflows from funds. - 3 - 
 
and net flows.
6 Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Del Guerico and Tkac 
(2002) emphasize this general position about a common positive correlation between 
prior fund performance and net flows, whereas Cashman et al. (2006) additionally prove 
a certain persistence of investors with regard to outflows of poor performing funds.
7 
Accordingly, investors react immediately to well-performing funds by making further 
investments while waiting to sell their positions in poor performing funds. Existing 
analytical work concerning such investors’ behavior has apparently led to different 
opinions in prior literature. As pointed out by Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993), 
within the poorest performing funds the investors react generally persistently and do not 
immediately withdraw their shares. Carhart (1997) argues that costs to withdraw shares 
have an important influence on fund returns.
8 Brown and Götzmann (1995) do not find 
any explanation for the correlation between high fees and persistence of investors in 
poor performing funds.
9 Alternatively, in the more recent literature Berk and Xu (2004) 
or Frazzini and Lamont (2006) highlight that investors withdraw their shares in 
regularly traded funds with poor performance.
 10 
  This paper provides a contrary view, since our results show that investors react 
quickly to market signals and withdraw their investments in crisis situations in the short 
term. In contrast to existing findings, we show that investors in funds do not follow the 
persistence hypothesis, but a kind of ’flow – following - flow behavior’. Due to 
different market signals (as further clarified in chapter 2), investors anticipate strong 
withdrawing behavior of other investors and might react in panic. One may ask why in 
past literature researchers did not find these results under crisis circumstances? In our 
view such phenomena is due to the fact that the cost of information decreased during the 
last 20 years in such a way that even private investors can react based on any 
                                                           
6 For example see Kane, Santini and Aber (1991), Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks (1991). 
7 Ippolito (1992) for example examines 143 open equity funds for the period from 1965 to 1984 and finds a positive 
linear relation between the growth rate of funds and the excess returns. 
8 Berk and Green (2004) on the other hand describe the characteristics of fund performance using a model with 
rationally acting investors and point out, that professional fund managers do not outperform passive traded 
benchmarks considering fees and taxes, so the influence is not that large. 
9 Besides, there is a mixed view to persistence of investors in well performing funds. Malkiel (1995) and Ibbotson 
and Götzmann (1994) find also positive performance persistence. Although some studies point to the fact that funds 
with higher tax and costs deliver an accordingly better performance to cover these costs (e.g. Ippolito 1989), newer 
studies argue that this is not the case (e.g. Elton et. al. [1993] and Ivkovic and Weisbenner [2006]). 
10 Berk and Xu (2004) take up the quality persistence from flow of funds and concern with the effects from fund 
flows on future returns. From their perspective there is a weakened respect between the past performances and capital 
flows in the fund market, which could originate from more special market frictions.  - 4 - 
 
information in the short term that might induce strategically complementary 
dependencies.
11 
  Existing literature seems to show that funds are confronted with the problem of 
carrying out cost-intensive and unprofitable trades in order to adapt the portfolio to new 
market situations.
12 Particularly in the event of unexpected outflows that have to be 
covered by liquidation of assets under ‘fire sale’ conditions profits appear to decrease. 
However, the majority of cash generating trades are carried out on the day after the 
withdrawal of fund shares by investors, so that the net asset value (NAV) of a fund will 
not completely transfer the real costs to the withdrawing investors but rather is carried 
by more patient investors who have remained in the fund. This leads to strategically 
complementary dependence. Therefore, the expectation of an increasing portion of 
withdrawing investors decreases the expectations of future returns so that the incentive 
for every investor to withdraw their shares rises with a liquidity shortage becoming a 
possible result.   
  Within this context, it is of major interest for the fund industry that investors who 
hold illiquid shares in a fund are faced with bigger complementary dependence than 
investors with more liquid assets that is due to higher costs of the liquidation with less 
liquid funds.
13 Regarding this, our empirical analysis considers the differences of 
outflows in dependence of fund categories. In general, we provide an empirical 
contribution with the aim of a better understanding of investors’ behavior in crisis 
situations.
14 Specifically, we contribute some empirical evidence to literature focusing 
in the German fund markets since the main interest of the scientific literature deals with 
the US market
15 that may be due to the fact that during the last 50 years no crisis from 
retail funds took place in Germany
16. In contrast, during the course of the financial crisis 
starting in 2007 and its evolving effects in 2008, a huge eruption and a negative balance 
of net flows occurred for the first time ever.
17 Generally, taking into account the 
fundamental influence of crises on the economic power of countries, it is important to 
                                                           
11 On account of this fact a bigger fragility and uncertainty on the financial markets occurs, on the other side markets 
tends to be more perfect and less driven by large well informed institutions.   
12 See for example Edelen (1999) or Coval and Stafford (2006). 
13 Under normal conditions less market participants can be found which are willing to pay the adjusted market price. 
14 Standard reference in the section of investor behavior in crisis situation is given by Allen and Gale (1998), Gorton 
(1988) and for the fund market. Edelen (1999) for example provides applicable research. 
15 Tkac (2004) gives a general overview above the American fund market and goes into regulatory methods and 
results for the fund branch. 
16 Bannier, Fecht and Tyrell (2006) and Ber et al. (2011) are two of rare research papers that provide an empirical 
study of the German fund market. 
17 The net outflows for the German industry in 2008 were about 27.782 million €. - 5 - 
 
understand the consequences of such eruptions. Therefore we use data of different 
German retail fund categories in order to analyze investors’ behavior depending upon 
fund category and prior performance.   
  The paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we start with basically describing a 
microeconomic model to gain an idea of the structural cooperation of market 
participants. The second part of this chapter serves as a description of model-theoretical 
backgrounds of our empirical analysis. Chapter 3 contains the empirical analysis to test 
our hypotheses and includes robustness checks to substantiate our results. The paper 
ends with Chapter 4 that includes a summary of our findings. 
 
2. Microeconomic model of net redemptions of fund shares 
The Internet age has accelerated the interconnection and information transfer of markets 
and individuals in such a way that reactions of investors on potentially significant 
information are faster than ever before. In this sense it is important to understand the 
process of information transfer in order to visualize the investors’ behavior and the 
movements of financial markets as a whole. 
  Following the model of Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) we assume a model with 
three periods. In period t0 N investors get a share of a retail fund. In t1 investors, who 
want to withdraw, get R1, as gross return of the fund after one period. In this respect, all 
investors decide at this time whether they withdraw their shares in t1 or in t2. For the 
simplification of this model we suppose that a certain number of investors     ∈  0,1  
leave the fund in t1 to get paid out. 
  Assuming that there are not any inflows generated in t1, withdrawing investors have 
to be paid by selling assets of the fund. Due to the verifiable illiquidity of fund shares 
with regard to transaction costs and asymmetrical information, shares cannot be sold at 
market price (NAV) in t1. To be able to pay R1 to withdrawing investors, a bigger 
portion of the fund must be sold depending on the level of illiquidity. 
  If the factor of illiquidity is  0  ,    ∗  1     shares of the fund will have to be sold 
to pay out    to withdrawing investors. For the 1- N patient investors, who stay until t2, 
there will be a payoff ratio of      
 
   . This failure or insolvency barrier ensures that 
repayments for patient investors are not smaller than zero. The model so far leads to a - 6 - 
 
strategic complementary problem between patient and impatient investors.
18 Assuming 
that outflows of the fund results in poor performance, patient investors have to count on 
worse performance. By enhancing the model with a component of possible inflows at 
any time, the coordination problem of investors can be mitigated. Thus early 
withdrawing investors can be paid out using new capital flows into the fund.
19 
  Furthermore, we assume that       is a rising function of inflows depending on past 
performance, so that investors react positively to prior generated fund performance and 
inflows will increase. Therefore the following payment arises with inclusion of steadily 
possible inflows for long-term investors: 
1  1         0,             
1       0,             
        
Investors have to decide whether they withdraw in period t1 and receive the amount R1 
or wait until t2 and obtain the amount calculated by the equation above, that 
demonstrates that payoffs for patient investors decreases with increasing     for      
     . However, if fundamental variable   is increasing, patient investors will expect a 
higher performance by their fund shares. Within this context, we can find an optimal 
solution for    . This solution depends on the fundamental variable   and therefore on 
scarcely measurable basic conditions. Furthermore, in reality optimum decisions of 
actors arise out of reliance based on decisions of other actors. This proves the possibility 
of multiple balances. Thus, two threshold ranges of the variable should be additionally 
defined. The threshold   is defined as a lower bound for investors who early withdraw 
their shares. 
  Definition 1: If the realization of the fundamental variable   lies below threshold  , 
so that     , all investors will withdraw their shares in period t1 regardless of their 
opinion about behavior of other investors. Thus, it is       1 . Similarly the upper 
bound can be defined. 
                                                           
18 Depending of the actions of early withdrawing investors, the patient investors have to adjust their investment 
behavior, so a coordination problem results. With rising portion of early withdrawing investors, the payment 
decreases in t2. 
19 Therefore, depending on the volume of capital inflows there has to be sold less or in the best case, no fund shares 
to finance the withdrawing investors. Under these circumstances, the influence of the illiquidity factor on the 
payment amount decreases. The necessary condition on inflows exists in a higher inflow rate if the fund has 
performed better in the past. - 7 - 
 
  Definition 2: If investors anticipate that the fundamental variable   lies above 
threshold   , they will remain in the fund until period t2 regardless of the possible 
behavior of the other investors, so that: 
      
1       0,             
1    1         0,             
 
Assuming that   , as a variable of historical performance of the fund, has influence on 
the portion of early withdrawing investors, the threshold      is defined as             , 
where I is the extent of the inflows. If redeeming of shares in period t1 is smaller than 
inflows, the upper bound will lie above the lower bound: 
 ̅        	     	           
However, if the redeemed value of fund shares is higher than the amount of inflows, the 
upper and lower bound will be at the same level: 
 ̅        	     	           
If      is true, investors will withdraw their shares early. In contrast, if      is true, 
investors will wait until period t2. In the case that          is valid, we get equilibrium 
          ̅    	. In general, within such a threshold range, two equilibriums arise. One 
equilibrium is characterized by investors withdrawing early and another equilibrium is 
observable where patient investors hold their shares until period t2. To solve the 
problem of multiple equilibrium, we now suppose that realization of   is not generally 
known to everyone in t1. Instead of this, investors receive an individual signal about   
in t1. Therefore, we assume that every investor i receives a signal             with 
  0  as a parameter which expresses the strength of the signal, and    for the 
idiosyncratic noise term which is determined by a distribution function   .   (with 
cumulative distribution function   . )
20 
  We now consider the critical value    , that provides the threshold where investors are 
indifferent in their behavior being patient or withdrawing early in period t1. Following 
Chen et. al (2010) this implies: 
                                                           
20 Then this signal can be understood as information which investors receive by a rating or public known information 
about a market or company for example, however, they individually evaluate this information and therefore generate 
different    for investment strategy. - 8 - 
 
 
1∞ 1         0,    
     
               
1        0 ,    
     
               
 
  




      
 
    1	
with the proportion of investors who face a signal below     and withdraw their funds in 
period t1 denoted as   
     
        and 
 
   
     
    as an expression for the posterior density 
over   . Using the conditions from above, we can define the critical threshold for 
investors facing individual signals as follows: 
  Definition 3: Under the condition of     ∈   investors, who withdraw their funds early 
(in t1), receiving an individual signal   which influences their investment behavior, we 
find a critical signal threshold    , where investors are indifferent investing in the long 
term or withdrawing early so that: 
        
1
 
            ,             
       ,             
 
    
	    	       
      
 
 . 
Therefore, our microeconomic model provides a theoretical basis for the behavior of 
investors: It appears that individuals react to signals with their reactions varying 
depending upon different circumstances. 
 
3. Data and Methodologies 
Our sample consists of 35.895 monthly observations from 1.672 German retail funds 
from March 2008 to April 2010. We included 1.672 funds to our sample that are 
assigned to a corresponding fund category. In detail, we examined695 ‘equity funds’, 
367 ‘fixed income funds’, 540 ‘balanced funds’, 58 ‘money market funds’, 11 
‘mortgage funds’ and 17 ‘convertible funds’. The related fund categories, net asset 
values, and monthly flows of funds were reported to Deutsche Bundesbank by German 
asset management companies.
21 We excluded all funds from our sample that were 
closed, merged with other retail funds or reported a net asset value less 1 Mio. € during 
our observation period. The monthly net redemptions of a fund j with NAV (Net Asset 
Value) at month i are calculated with equation 
                                                           
21 We thank the German Association of Investment and Asset Management (BVI ) for their friendly 
support on this data issue. - 9 - 
 
   	               
                      
      , 
.	
The monthly performance of a fund j  with NAV (Net Asset Value) at month i  is 
computed as follows: 
               1  
    ,       	             
      ,       	              , 
  
Furthermore, we calculate the standardized performance indicator ‘       ’ over the 
respective observation period   1 ,…,   recursively to assess the past performance 
with the beginning of our observation period: 
           100 
                                     ∗           
⋮      ⋮ 
                                         ,  ∗         ,      
                                       ∗          . 
The standardized net redemption indicator ‘      ’ over the respective observation 
period   1 ,…,   is also assessed recursively to identify the past net redemptions: 
          100 
                                           ∗               
⋮      ⋮ 
                                          ,  ∗            
                                        ∗           . 
Several statistic assessments are conducted in order to describe the structure and 
dynamics of fund flows from 2008 to 2010 with a primary focus on net redemptions 
during the financial crisis in 2007/2008. Moreover, a number of ordinary least square 
regressions are applied in order to find some evidence on the relationship between a 
number of independent variables that are listed in Table 3 and net redemption of fund 
shares. 
  - 10 - 
 
4. Results 
During the financial market turmoil in 2008, the German fund industry was faced with 
the most dramatic outflows from retail funds in more than three decades (for details see 
BVI Jahrbücher [1999–2010]). Not surprisingly, our sample (which includes 6 different 
categories of retail funds) shows tremendous redemptions of fund shares from 
September 2008 to November 2008. With the default of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 and a peak net outflow from funds of 3.77% in October 2008, the preliminary 
height of the crisis was reached. In contrast, flows of new money into funds were 
recorded by the fund industry during 2009. In addition to the average monthly fund 
flows, Table 1 reports the monthly percentage of funds characterized by two month net 
outflows that means that outflows are higher than inflows over a two month period. 
Although we assess a surprisingly high percentage of funds reporting two month net 
outflows over the entire observation period, a peak of this ratio occurs in September 
2008 which can be assigned to the height of the financial crisis reached as a result of the 
turmoil faced by several major banks around the globe. In contrast, the percentage of 
funds reporting two month net outflows fall below 40% level from May 2009 to 
September 2009. However, the relatively high percentage of funds reporting two month 
net outflows over the entire observation period might be explained by cross-sectional 
fund flows. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
A more detailed view on the various fund categories covered by our sample suggests 
that under crisis circumstances investors might react in a different manner depending on 
the related fund category. Table 2 demonstrates that with respect to their median of 
outflows ‘money market funds’, ‘fixed income funds’ and funds invested in convertible 
bonds are faced with the highest net redemption of fund shares by investors over our 
observation period from 2008 to 2010. Furthermore, the highest percentage of funds 
reporting two month net outflows are also observed in the event of ‘money market 
funds’, ‘fixed income funds’ and ‘convertible funds’
22. 
 Approximated  99
th percentiles of two month net redemptions calculated on the basis 
of estimated extreme value distributions show only slight differences between ‘equity 
                                                           
22 Convertible funds are highly invested in convertible bonds. - 11 - 
 
funds’, ‘mortgage and convertible funds’ and ‘fixed income funds’.
23 Apparently, the 
most tremendous redemption risk over the period from 2008 to 2010 is observed for 
‘money market funds’. In contrast, so-called ‘balanced funds’ that have to be invested in 
equities and fixed income securities as required by investment directives show, 
unsurprisingly, much more moderate evidence of redemption risk than the other 
aforementioned categories of funds. This may be explained by diversification strategies 
that are signaled to investors by reporting lower losses during financial market crisis 
episodes. 
  As stated previously, a great majority of funds recorded massive losses during the 
financial markets crisis of 2008 as a result of the subsequent global tumbling asset 
markets. Estimated 99
th percentiles of funds` losses reported in Table 2 are significantly 
higher at ‘equity funds’ than that at ‘fixed income funds’ which might be due to more 
volatile equity markets. These market characteristics could also explain the 
diversification effects of ‘balanced funds’ since this category of funds has to be invested 
in equities as well as in fixed income securities as given by investment directives. 
Finally, Table 2 shows that the computed sensitivities of ‘outperforming funds’ are 
clearly higher than the sensitivities of ‘underperforming funds’ in general.
24 
Furthermore, the highest values of this sensitivity measure for our three examined 
subsamples are provided in the event of ‘money market funds’ and ‘fixed income 
funds’. In contrast, the sensitivity measures suggest the lowest sensitivity of 
shareholders in ‘equity funds’ and ‘balanced funds’. Therefore it seems likely that 
investors in ‘money market funds’ and ‘fixed income funds’ react more dramatically 
than investors in ‘equity funds’ or ‘balanced funds’. This might be related to the fact 
that in the past, ‘fixed income funds’ and ‘money market funds’ were promoted to be 
the more appropriate investments for risk-adverse investors by the fund industry. In 
summary, our results provide some evidence that based upon fund flows, ‘balanced 
funds’ can be declared ‘winners’ over the observation period. This evidence reflects a 
relative low risk-bearing inherent to this fund category. In contrast, ‘money market 
                                                           
23 Approaches emanating from Extreme-Value-Theory allow the reliable prediction of the likelihood of rare but also 
plausible events since they model the ‘fat tails’ of empirical distributions with sufficient accuracy. In such a way they 
can also assess the daily net redemptions of funds and the fund performance from empirical data even in times of a 
crisis (Reiss R.–D. and Thomas M. [2000], Longin [2000], Embrechts, Klüppelberg, Mikosch [1997]). For the 
estimation of parameters we rely on a genetic algorithm, which deliver reliable and valid results for our purposes. 
24 Sensitivity equals the ratio between 99% percentiles of losses and 99% of two month net redemptions  - 12 - 
 
funds’ are faced with surprisingly tremendous redemptions during a period of increasing 
yields of money market instruments. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Next, we examine various regression models to test our hypothesis that poor performing 
funds are punished by tremendous redemption of fund shares with a shrinking 
confidence in the fund industry as a result of a financial crisis and that significant 
outflows subsequently lead to further outflows. Moreover, with these regressions we 
search for further support of our hypothesis that investors show a different redemption 
behavior over our observation period from 2008 to 2010 depending upon the type of 
fund category. In general, we test various performance indicators, measures of prior 
redemption of fund shares and a couple of macroeconomic and financial market 
indicators as control variables as they relate to independent variable ‘evtnma2m’. This 
variable reflects the percentiles of two month net redemptions of fund shares that are 
estimated by appropriate extreme value distributions. As figured out before, significant 
differences relating to the redemption of fund shares among different categories of 
funds has been observed from March 2008 to April 2010. Therefore, we introduce the 
given fund classification as a factored predictor variable to our panel regression with 
randomized effects at this stage.
25 With an r-squared value of 46.16 % for the within 
regression and an r-squared value of 81.62 % for the between regression, our model 
shows a strong overall relationship between the independent and dependent variables. 
Table 3 reports positive and statistically significant coefficients for the performance 
variables  ‘evtperf2m’,  ‘evtperf’ and ‘log10perf’ that reflect the corresponding 
percentiles of the performance over the prior two months, percentiles of the prior 
monthly performance and our standardized prior performance indicator, respectively. In 
contrast, our logarithmized indicator on prior redemption of fund shares ‘log10nma’ 
enters the regression with a negative and statistically significant coefficient. Among the 
control variables, our indicators on the performance in global stock markets (‘msci’), 
stock market uncertainty (‘vola’)  and our variable reflecting ’gold’ prices generates 
positive and statistically significant coefficients. In contrast, a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the dependent variable and the indicator on global bond 
                                                           
25 Therefore our regression model equals       2                                 with   as a vector of 
our performance variables,     as a vector of our net redemption variables,   as a vector of control variables and   
as factorized predictor variable of fund categories;    and   are the respective error terms.  - 13 - 
 
market prices ‘gbi’, the ‘libor’ rate as well as the global creditworthiness of banks ‘cds’ 
is reported in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
So far, it can be shown that both performance variables and flow variables display a 
significant relationship for the two month net redemption of fund shares. It is clear that 
there is some evidence that the performance indicators have a negative influence on the 
two month net redemption since the obtained coefficients exhibit a positive influence on 
the percentiles of respective two month net redemptions of fund shares.
26 In contrast, 
our flow indicator ‘log10nma’ exhibits a negative influence on the two month net 
redemption. In addition, it is noteworthy that apart from ‘convertible funds’, the fund 
classification variable has a significant negative relationship with the dependent variable 
for all fund categories but to a different extent, whereas the classifier for ‘equity funds’ 
has been set as the base of our factor variable. Taking into account that related fund 
categories show significant performance differences over the observation period, these 
findings suggest that the prior performance of a fund is one of the driving forces for the 
redemption of fund shares by investors. 
  Following our basic concept to distinguish between ‘outperforming funds’ and 
‘underperforming funds’, we examine the relationship between the chosen independent 
variables and the percentiles of the respective two month net redemptions by panel 
regressions with random effects on these two subsamples during the next stage of our 
research. Apart from the categories of ‘money market funds’, ‘convertible and mortgage 
funds’, all other related fund categories yield negative and statistically significant 
coefficients in the event of ‘outperforming funds’, whereas this factor variable enters 
the regression with negative coefficients in the case of ‘underperforming funds’. By 
comparing the results of regressions with random effects reported in Table 4, it can be 
said that there is little variation between the two models. Only creditworthiness of banks 
(‘cds’) shows a statistically significant but weak effect in the event of ‘underperforming 
funds’ but not in the case of ‘outperforming funds’. In addition, the ‘gold’ price is the 
sole statistically significant factor for ‘outperforming funds’. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                           
26 For better orientation it should be emphasized at this point that the higher the percentile of the respective two 
month net redemptions the more fund shares are expected to be redeemed by investors. - 14 - 
 
  Although these two regression models provide only weak support for our 
assumptions, we can ascertain that the persistence of  prior performance of funds as well 
as the categories of funds influence the two month net redemptions. This observation 
corresponds with prior research (for example see Ippolito [1992], Sirri and Tufano 
[1998] or Berk and Xu [2004]). This weakly supporting data for our hypothesis might 
be a result of our relatively rough distinction between ‘outperforming’ and 
‘underperforming funds’ at this stage in our research. 
  Therefore, in the next step we further test three ordinary least square regressions 
(OLS) in order to gain a better understanding of the relative importance of the obtained 
coefficients at subsamples of  ‘equity funds’, ‘fixed income funds’ and ‘money market 
funds’, respectively by analyzing provided standardized beta coefficients.
27 By 
comparing the results of these linear regressions reported in Table 6 we see that the 
majority of our independent variables are significantly related with the percentiles of 
two month net redemptions.  
  By analyzing standardized beta coefficients in detail we find an overall strong 
positive and statistically significant influence on net redemptions by the indicators on 
the prior performance (‘evtperf2m’ and ‘evtperf’), whereas in the case of ‘equity funds’, 
the logarithmic performance indicator (‘log10perf’) shows only a weak but statistically 
significant influence on two month net redemptions. By comparing standardized beta 
coefficients obtained by the logarithmic net redemption indicator (‘log10nma’) we find 
a strong relationship with the dependent variable for all different fund categories since it 
enters the regressions with negative and statistically significant coefficients. In the case 
of fixed income and ‘money market funds’, the ‘msci’ reflecting global stock market 
performance does not result in a statistically significant coefficient, whereas in the case 
of ‘fixed income funds’, global creditworthiness  (‘cds’) clearly does not have any 
significant impact on the two month outflows. With respect to ‘money market funds’, 
we do not find a significant relationship between the ‘libor’ rate and the two month net 
redemptions. The control variables are generally characterized by relatively low 
standard beta coefficients. Solely standardized beta coefficients obtained by the global 
                                                           
27 In detail these regression models correspond to       2                            with   as a vector 
of our performance variables,     as a vector of our net redemption variables,   as a vector of control variables and 
  as factorized predictor variable of fund categories;   is the respective error term. For these least square linear 
regressions (OLS) we use the same predictors as applied to the panel regressions described before. In addition, as a 
kind of robustness test we precautionary compute the variance inflation factors as listed in Table 5, which suggest 
that there are not any strong collinearities between our depending variables. Other robustness tests confirm the 
validity of our models as well. - 15 - 
 
stock market indicator and the performance indicator for the global bond markets enter 
the regressions with relatively high coefficients in case of ‘equity funds’ but not for our 
subsamples of ‘fixed income’ and ‘money market funds’. 
  In summary, it can be said thus far that our results from the examined linear 
regressions on ‘equity funds’, ‘fixed income funds’ and ‘money market funds’ are 
consistent with our hypothesis that the prior performance of funds, as well as persistent 
prior redemptions of fund shares by investors are strongly related with two month net 
redemptions. This provides some evidence that poor performing funds are punished 
with high redemption rates of fund shares. Regardless of whether these net redemptions 
are caused by sales activities of the asset management companies or solely based on the 
investors´ information about prior performance of funds in general, it seems likely that 
investors are not so ‘ignorant’ staying with poor performing funds. Quite the opposite, 
investors seem to gather information about the funds´ performance and decide on a 
relative short term whether to redeem their fund shares or not. Within this context, it 
might be relevant that the information cost to consumers has clearly been lowered over 
the recent years due to increased access to electronic media (see for example Bogan 
[2008]). Our observation of reactions by investors in such a short term is in considerable 
contrast to the argument presented by Sirri and Tufano (1992), who pointed out that 
consumers abstain from redeeming fund shares when faced with poor performing funds 
due to high information costs.  
  Furthermore, the examined regressions also suggest that redemption of fund shares 
by investors over prior periods generally have an impact on the flows of funds. Since 
our indicators on the persistence of prior net redemptions result in negative and 
statistically significant coefficients the applied regressions provide strong support for 
our hypothesis that a significant number of fund investors redeem their shares based 
upon fund outflows as a result of other investors redeeming their shares. As consumers 
typically do not receive any information on investment flows for funds in detail, it 
seems more likely that flows into funds and out of funds are caused by sales activities of 
the asset management companies and/or the result of bad news concerning the fund 
industry as a whole in general. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
In order to confirm the observed relationship between prior performance of funds and 
the net redemptions of fund shares, we examine further ordinary least square (OLS) - 16 - 
 
regressions on each quintile of the two month fund performance. Furthermore, using 
these regressions we also attempt to prove the influence of the related fund category on 
two month net redemptions. At this stage, one should keep in mind that the highest 
quintiles of this performance measurement represent well performing funds. The results 
reported in Table 7 show the corresponding standardized beta coefficients in order to 
assess the relative strength of coefficients received by relevant independent variables.  
  Comparing standardized beta coefficients obtained by the logarithmic net redemption 
indicator (‘log10nma’)  also provides strong support for our hypothesis that the 
persistence of prior net redemptions of fund shares has a substantial impact on 
subsequent further net redemptions because the provided coefficients get a more 
prominent place among the coefficients with increasing quintiles of the two month 
performance. In addition, the logarithmic performance indicator (‘log10perf’) appears to 
show an increasing influence on higher percentiles of the two month performance 
whereas standardized beta coefficients get the highest values among the provided 
coefficients. The obtained standardized beta coefficients of ‘log10nma’ and ‘log10perf’ 
clearly exhibit opposite patterns. While persistent net inflows seem to reduce 
subsequent further net inflows, a corresponding persistence of prior positive 
performance amplifies fund outflows if such funds appear to display a lower 
performance. This effect is confirmed by our variable ‘evtperf’  which enters the 
regressions with high standardized beta coefficients in the event of poor performing 
funds as well as in the case of funds that report a positive monthly performance.  
  In summary, it appears likely that investors tend to flee from poor performing funds 
to a much greater degree after experiencing consistently high prior performance by such 
funds. This might be explained by a significant number of well informed investors who 
prefer ensuring a profit over further risk-taking with such funds when the respective 
fund performance is shifting from well to poor. Therefore, our results are consistent 
with the findings by Cashman et al. (2006) such that they observe high outflows both 
for well and poor performing funds. Cashman et al. find a similar shape of curve of fund 
inflows but to a relatively greater extent in the case of poor performing funds. Assuming 
that inflows of new money are generally reduced by consumers under tensioned market 
conditions in light of a declining fund industry, our results might be more easily 
explained by the behavior of investors in more panicked conditions. While our findings 
are fairly surprising, they also appear to be supported by standardized beta coefficients - 17 - 
 
of the examined fund categories that turn from negative at low percentiles to positive at 
high percentiles based on their two month performance. In addition, the sign of 
standardized beta coefficients of the indicator on creditworthiness of banks (‘cds’) not 
surprisingly changes from positive to negative with increasing percentiles of the two 
month performance. Furthermore, it should be noted that the indicator on the 
performance of global stock markets (‘msci’) enters the regressions with relative high 
positive standard beta coefficients whereas our indicator on the performance of global 
bond markets (‘gbi’) apparently influences two month net redemptions of fund shares in 
the opposite direction. 
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
During the financial crisis of 2008, ‘money market funds’, ‘fixed income funds’ and 
funds invested in convertible bonds have been faced with the highest net redemptions of 
fund shares by investors ever witnessed. By summarizing our results, we can point to 
strong evidence that investors behave in a selective manner when they decide whether 
or not to redeem their shares from funds. 
  In general, we find that the prior performance of funds had a negative and 
statistically significant influence on the net redeeming of fund shares by investors over 
our observation period from March 2008 to April 2010. However, our results do not 
confirm some findings in the literature (Ippolito [1992] or Sirri and Tufano [1998]) that 
consumers are investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the 
prior period while failing to flee from poor performing funds at the same rate. This 
contradiction might be due to the high frequency of unfortunate events that led to 
tremendous losses by the banking and fund industry during the financial crisis of 2008. 
Furthermore, lower information costs for investors resulting from the rapidly growing 
availability of electronic media might amplify such behavior of investors. In addition, 
we find some evidence pointing to another specific behavior of consumers over the 
observation period; they appear to flee from poorly performing funds to a much greater 
degree after having experienced a high level of performance in prior periods. This 
observation might be explained by a significant number of active investors who prefer 
ensuring a profit over further risk-taking when their fund performance is shifting from - 18 - 
 
good to bad. The role that institutional investors play relating to this observation will be 
the subject of future research. 
  Although our regression models do not provide strong support for our hypothesis that 
those investors in different categories of funds show an easily distinguishable reaction 
our measures of redeeming sensitivity which are based on estimates of extreme value, 
distributions suggest that consumers indeed appear to redeem fund shares to varying 
degrees depending on the related fund category.  
  Furthermore, our regression models provide some empirical evidence that 
redemption of fund shares by investors in prior periods generally have an impact on 
more recent flows of funds. Therefore, our findings provide strong support for our 
assumption that investors redeem fund shares to a great extent subsequent to 
redemptions of fund shares by other consumers.  
  As a result, patient investors have to accept further losses due to ‘fire sales’ which 
might have had a substantial impact on the overall fund performance and lead to further 
redemptions of fund shares over the course of the financial crisis (some basic studies on 
this issue are done by Edelen [1999] and Massa and Phallippou [2005]). Such 
amplifying effects might be quite similar to the effects of self-accelerating spirals of 
liquidity risk within the global banking system under crisis circumstances described by 
Brunnermeier (2009). 
  In conclusion of our study, we emphasize that the fund industry is well-advised to 
establish a strong self-regulatory framework that ensures that fund managers have a 
fairly clear idea of the different dimensions of liquidity risk such as redemption risk and 
market liquidity risk. It is worth noting that generating liquidity under tensioned market 
conditions in order to cover increasing redemptions of fund shares causes certain 
negative externalities for patient consumers that remain invested in such tumbling funds 
since they have to accept further losses by additional unexpected liquidity costs (For 
details, our theoretical model explains such externalities in section 2 of this paper). This 
may allude to possible discussions within the industry to introduce a redemption fee that 
takes into account performance losses caused by the necessity of fund managers to 
cover liquidity needs in the event of high redemption ratios or to introduce a 
prolongation of notice periods. In order to contribute some enlightening arguments to 
such a discussion, we will examine the degree of such externalities in the next phase of 
our research work. - 19 - 
 
  However, under the assumption that poor performances of fund managers are 
punished by significant redemptions of fund shares by consumers that appear to be 
confirmed by our findings, fund managers should be obliged to hold a sufficient part of 
liquid assets at any time to cover such redemptions of fund shares. In order to avoid 
negative externalities for patient consumers to a great extent, such liquidity risks should 
be better regulated and proved by regulatory authorities especially with regard to funds 
that report poorer performance than a respective peer group. - 20 - 
 
Appendix 
Table 1: Two month net redemptions grouped by month of observation period 
Our sample contains 35.895 monthly observations from 1.672 funds from March 2008 to April 2010. 
Among the 1.672 funds are 695 ‘equity funds’, 367 ‘fixed income funds’, 540 ‘balanced funds’, 58 
‘money market funds’, 11 ‘mortgage funds’ and 17 ‘convertible funds’. Funds are classified as ‘balanced 
funds’ when they are invested in equities and fixed income securities. Per definition ‘convertible funds’ 
are funds that are invested in convertible bonds. The monthly net redemptions are calculated as the 
difference of inflows into funds and outflows from funds. The two month net redemptions equal the sum 
of net redemption in two consecutive months. The percentage of funds with outflows is calculated as the 
ratio of the number of funds with negative two month net redemptions (outflows) to the total number of 


















01.04.2008 2.78%  45.17%  01.04.2009 0.56%  43.32% 
01.05.2008 2.53%  46.65%  01.05.2009 1.53%  38.19% 
01.06.2008 2.14%  50.08%  01.06.2009 1.81%  35.99% 
01.07.2008 1.38%  48.13%  01.07.2009 1.89%  37.25% 
01.08.2008 0.43%  54.45%  01.08.2009 2.11%  35.17% 
01.09.2008 -0.91%  63.85% 01.09.2009 2.79%  35.29% 
01.10.2008 -3.77%  59.97% 01.10.2009 2.09%  38.95% 
01.11.2008 -2.47%  45.39% 01.11.2009 2.10%  39.79% 
01.12.2008 3.49%  42.34%  01.12.2009 0.97%  42.05% 
01.01.2009 3.85%  46.61%  01.01.2010 0.72%  43.79% 
01.02.2009 0.12%  45.49%  01.02.2010 1.76%  41.28% 
01.03.2009 0.23%  46.66%  01.03.2010 1.33%  43.12% 
 
 
Table 2: Two month net redemptions grouped by categories of funds 
The percentage of funds with outflows is calculated as the ratio of the number of funds with negative two 
month net redemptions (outflows) to the total number of observations. (n = number of observations, 
average and median are calculated over the entire observation period from 2008 to 2010). Sensitivity 
equals the ratio between 99
th percentiles of losses and 99
th percentiles of two month net redemptions. 99
th 
percentiles are calculated on the basis of approximated extreme value distributions (GEV or GPD).
28 
 
Equity Funds  Money Market Funds   Mortgage Funds  
n   14,768 / 7,677  1,427 / 983  284 / 103 
% observations with outflows  51.98%  68.89%  36.27% 
average / median of outflows  -0.11% / 0.90%  -5.82% / -4.27%  -1.49% / 0.11% 
99
th percentile net redemptions  34.98%  31.04%  31.81% 
99
th percentile losses  53.02%  29.79%  43.22% 
sensitivity (entire sample)  0.66  0.90  0.74 
sensitivity (‘outperforming funds’)  1.16  1.49  1.65 
sensitivity (‘underperforming funds’)  0.64  0.86  0.74 
Balanced Funds   Fixed Income Funds   Convertible Funds 
N  10,536 / 4,318  7,990 / 4,719  394 / 251 
% observations with outflows  40.98%  59.06%  63.71% 
average / median of outflows  3.62% / 0.00%  0.45% / -0.93%  -2.24% / -2.12% 
99
th percentile net redemptions  18.55%  31.04%  31.81% 
99
th percentile losses  29.79%  34.16%  43.22% 
sensitivity (entire sample)  0.62  0.91  0.74 
sensitivity (‘outperforming funds’)  0.78  1.17  1.65 
sensitivity (‘underperforming funds’)  0.62  0.85  0.74 
                                                           
28 GEV (Generalized Extreme Value Distribution), GPD (Generalized Pareto Distribution) - 21 - 
 
Table 3: Dependent and independent variables 
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evtperf2m 
percentiles of two 
month 
performance attribution 
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       2                 ,       2     
msci  percentage change of 
MSCI World  extracted from Bloomberg
30 
vola  14days volatility of  
MSCI World  extracted from Bloomberg 
gbi 
percentage change of 
JPM Global Bond 
Index 
extracted from Bloomberg 
gold  percentage change of 
gold price  extracted from Bloomberg 
libor  libor rate  extracted from Bloomberg 
cds  credit default swap rate 
of banks  extracted from Bloomberg 
 
                                                           
29 Approaches emanating from Extreme-Value-Theory allow the reliable prediction of the likelihood of rare but also 
plausible events since they model the ‘fat tails’ of empirical distributions with sufficient accuracy. (Reiss R.–D. and 
Thomas M. [2000], Embrechts [2001], Embrechts, Klüppelberg, Mikosch [1997]). For the estimation of parameters we 
relied on a genetic algorithm which delivered reliable and valid results for our purposes. 
30 Bloomberg PLC is one of the leading providers of financial market information - 22 - 
 
Table 4: Panel regression with random effects 
This table shows the results of a panel regression with random effects. The percentiles of two month net 
redemptions of fund shares are defined as the dependent variable. The independent variables are listed in 
Table 3. The factor variable for fund categories is related to equity funds as the base level. The sample 
covers the two month net redemptions of 33.739 observations and 1.648 funds respectively over the 
period from March 2008 to April 2010. Within-cluster correlation is clustered at the level of funds. The 
effective number of observations is on the order of number of unique funds. 
 
evtnma2m  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
evtperf2m 0.1987 0.0062 32.29 0.0000 0.1866 0.2107 
evtperf 0.4830 0.0061 79.07 0.0000 0.4710 0.4950 
log10perf 0.2017 0.0076 26.57 0.0000 0.1868 0.2166 
log10nma -0.3403 0.0084 -40.48 0.0000 -0.3568 -0.3238 
msci 0.7988 0.0248 32.18 0.0000 0.7502 0.8475 
vola 1.4143 0.0868 16.29 0.0000 1.2441 1.5845 
gbi -1.3773 0.0544 -25.3 0.0000 -1.4841 -1.2706 
gold 0.0549 0.0193 2.85 0.0040 0.0172 0.0926 
libor -0.0114 0.0008 -15.21 0.0000 -0.0129 -0.0100 
cds -0.0003 0.0000 -5.32 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0002 
money market funds  -0.0233 0.0080 -2.91 0.0040 -0.0389 -0.0076 
mortgage funds  -0.0710 0.0173 -4.1 0.0000 -0.1050 -0.0370 
balanced funds  -0.0347 0.0037 -9.37 0.0000 -0.0420 -0.0275 
fixed income funds  -0.0266 0.0040 -6.66 0.0000 -0.0345 -0.0188 
convertible funds  -0.0070 0.0146 -0.48 0.6350 -0.0356 0.0217 
cons 0.5367 0.0103 51.98 0.0000 0.5165 0.5570 
 
sigma_u .04098684; sigma_e .18753532; rho..0455888 
R-sq: within  = 0.4616; between = 0.8162; overall = 0.5612 
Wald chi2(20) = 38996.29; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Table 5: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of independent variables applied to ordinary least square 
(OLS) regressions 
This table reports the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) to test the dependent variables on collinearities. 
The Variance Inflation Factors have an intuitive interpretation. Variance Inflation Factors less than 5 
indicates that the independent variable shows only weak multicollinearity (for further information on 
Variance Inflation Factors see Belsley et al. 1980). 
 











money market funds  1.08 0.9251
mortgage funds  1.02 0.9837
balanced funds  1.36 0.7339
fixed income funds  1.30 0.7720
convertible funds  1.02 0.9803
Mean VIF  2.37   Table 6: Panel Regression with random effects applied to subsamples of ‘outperforming funds’ and ‘underperforming funds’ 
This table shows the results of a panel regression with random effects of independent variables listed in Table 3 on percentiles of two month net redemptions of fund 
shares. The factor variable for fund categories is related to equity funds as the base level. In the event of outperforming funds the sample covers the two month net 
redemptions for 13.663 observations and 1.047 funds  over the period from March 2008 to April 2010. In the case of ‘underperforming funds’ the sample covers the two 
month net redemptions for 20.076 observations and 1.110 funds over the period from March 2008 to April 2010. ‘Outperforming funds’ reported a higher net asset value 
(NAV) at the end of the observed month due to a positive performance attribution since the beginning of the observation period in March 2008 whereas ‘underperforming 
funds’ reported a lower net asset value (NAV) at the end of the observed month due to a negative performance attribution since the beginning of the observation period in 
2008. Within-cluster correlation is clustered at the level of funds. The effective number of observations is on the order of number of unique funds.  
 
 
  Outperforming Funds  Underperforming Funds 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>z  [95% Conf. Interval]  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>z  [95% Conf. Interval] 
evtperf2m  0.1909 0.0102 18.75  0.0000 0.1710  0.2109 0.1909 0.0102 18.75  0.0000  0.1460  0.1755 
evtperf  0.5551 0.0096 57.67  0.0000 0.5363  0.5740 0.5551 0.0096 57.67  0.0000  0.3994  0.4286 
log10perf  0.2820 0.0136 20.72  0.0000 0.2553  0.3086 0.2820 0.0136 20.72  0.0000  0.3051  0.3568 
log10nma -0.3798  0.0139  -27.28  0.0000  -0.4071  -0.3525 -0.3798  0.0139 -27.28 0.0000  -0.4979  -0.4436 
msci  0.5077 0.0400 12.70  0.0000 0.4294  0.5861 0.5077 0.0400 12.70  0.0000  0.7974  0.9142 
vola  1.0269  0.1478 6.95  0.0000  0.7372  1.3166  1.0269  0.1478 6.95  0.0000 1.5654  1.9610 
gbi -0.9928  0.0904  -10.98  0.0000  -1.1700  -0.8156 -0.9928  0.0904 -10.98 0.0000  -1.5460  -1.2965 
gold  0.0841  0.0327 2.57  0.0100  0.0201  0.1481  0.0841  0.0327 2.57  0.0100  -0.0111  0.0754 
libor -0.0204  0.0014  -15.08  0.0000  -0.0231  -0.0178 -0.0204  0.0014 -15.08 0.0000  -0.0043  -0.0005 
cds  0.0001  0.0001 1.37  0.1710  0.0000  0.0003  0.0001  0.0001 1.37  0.1710  -0.0005 -0.0003 
money  market  funds  0.0486  0.0170 2.86  0.0040  0.0153  0.0819  0.0486  0.0170 2.86  0.0040  -0.0697 -0.0200 
mortgage  funds  -0.0551  0.0345 -1.6  0.1110  -0.1228  0.0126  -0.0551  0.0345 -1.6  0.1110  -0.1312 -0.0183 
balanced funds  -0.0305  0.0073  -4.19  0.0000  -0.0448  -0.0162 -0.0305  0.0073  -4.19 0.0000  -0.0423  -0.0157 
fixed income funds  -0.0303  0.0086  -3.53  0.0000  -0.0471 -0.0135  -0.0303  0.0086  -3.53  0.0000  -0.0442  -0.0182 
convertible  funds  0.0199  0.0381 0.52  0.6010  -0.0547  0.0945  0.0199  0.0381 0.52  0.6010  -0.0495  0.0341 
cons  0.3830 0.0215 17.78  0.0000 0.3408  0.4252 0.3830 0.0215 17.78  0.0000  0.5668  0.6424 
  sigma_u .07436788; sigma_e .19598406; rho .12586572 
R-sq: within = 0.5300; between = 0.6199;overall = 0.5621 
Wald chi2(20) = 17303.28; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
sigma_u .07053144; sigma_e .17440535; rho .1405599 
R-sq: within = 0.4179; between = 0.5575;overall = 0.4472 
Wald chi2(20) = 15928.93; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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Table 7: Ordinary least square (OLS) regressions for the subsamples of ‘equity funds’, ‘fixed income funds’ and ‘money market funds’ 
This table shows the results of an ordinary least square (OLS) regression of independent variables listed in Table 3 on percentiles of two month net redemptions of fund 
shares. In addition to coefficients and standard errors, the standardized beta coefficients are calculated. The sample covers the two month net redemptions for 13.848 
observations of equity funds, 7.726 observations of fixed income funds, and 1.373 observations of money market funds over the period from March 2008 to April 2010. 
 
 
  Equity Funds  Fixed Income Funds  Money Market Funds 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>|t|  Beta  Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>|t|  Beta  Coef.  Std. 
Err. 
t P>|t|  Beta 
evtperf2m 0.1966 0.0098 20.12  0.0000 0.2223  0.1888 0.0122 15.43  0.0000  0.1785  0.1434  0.0278  5.15  0.0000  0.1388 
evtperf  0.3965 0.0098  40.4  0.0000 0.4510  0.6867 0.0122 56.13  0.0000  0.6358  0.7698  0.0282 27.26  0.0000  0.7264 
log10perf  0.0766 0.0096  7.96  0.0000 0.0913  0.2812 0.0160  17.6  0.0000  0.3409  0.1174  0.0254  4.62  0.0000  0.1324 
log10nma -0.2754  0.0113  -24.43  0.0000 -0.2704  -0.3621 0.0166 -21.82  0.0000  -0.4317  -0.1460 0.0249  -5.87 0.0000  -0.1674 
msci  1.0029 0.0475 21.11  0.0000 0.2317  0.0459 0.0406  1.13  0.2580  0.0103  -0.1133  0.1035  -1.1  0.2730  -0.0237 
vola  1.3619 0.1572  8.66  0.0000 0.0810  0.9129 0.1460  6.25  0.0000  0.0521  0.8191  0.3728  2.2  0.0280  0.0432 
gbi -1.8474  0.1004  -18.4  0.0000  -0.1503  -0.3335  0.0909  -3.67 0.0000 -0.0265 -0.6228  0.2473  -2.52  0.0120 -0.0427 
gold  0.1128 0.0349  3.24  0.0010 0.0224  -0.0688 0.0329 -2.09 0.0360 -0.0132 -0.1489  0.0838  -1.78  0.0760 -0.0261 
libor -0.0112  0.0014  -8.06  0.0000  -0.0644  -0.0025  0.0012  -2.04 0.0410 -0.0144 -0.0020  0.0034  -0.6  0.5460 -0.0105 
cds -0.0005  0.0001  -5.54  0.0000  -0.0442  -0.0001  0.0001  -1.59 0.1120 -0.0115 -0.0004  0.0002  -1.77  0.0770 -0.0299 
cons  0.7143  0.0168  42.48  0.0000 .  0.2620  0.0152  17.22 0.0000 .  0.1731  0.0335  5.17  0.0000 . 
 
F( 10, 14885) = 1151.61; Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.4362; Adj R-squared = 0.4358 
Root MSE = .23216 
F( 10,  8082) = 2353.02; Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.7443; Adj R-squared = 0.7440 
Root MSE = .15436 
F( 10, 1420) =  443.01; Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.7573; Adj R-squared = 0.7556 
Root MSE = .16716 
 
 
 Table 8: Standardized Beta Coefficients from ordinary least square (OLS) regressions applied to 
different quintiles of two month performance 
This table displays the standardized beta coefficients of ordinary least square (OLS) regressions of 
independent variables listed in Table 3 on the percentiles of two month net redemptions of fund shares. 
The sample covers the two month net redemptions of the entire sample over the period from March 2008 
to April 2010. 
 
1st Quintile  2nd Quintile  3rd Quintile  4th Quintile  5th Quintile 
evtperf2m 0,1777***  0,0203  0,0733***  0,1377***  0,1048*** 
evtperf 0,4714***  0,2884***  0,2265***  0,2404***  0,4113*** 
log10perf 0,0283  0,2081***  0,2030***  0,3691***  0,3592*** 
log10nma -0,1686***  -0,3978***  -0,3677***  -0,5060***  -0,4871*** 
msci 0,1913***  0,2545***  0,1436***  0,1543***  0,2115*** 
vola 0,0300***  0,1640***  0,1194***  0,1072***  0,0746*** 
gbi -0,1010***  -0,1452***  -0,1243***  -0,1442***  -0,1125*** 
gold 0,0568***  0,0283  -0,0348***  -0,0216  0,0281*** 
libor -0,0504***  -0,1559***  -0,0914*** -0,0571***  -0,0251 
cds 0,0972***  -0,0507**  -0,0638***  -0,0942***  -0,0413*** 
money market funds  -0,0644***  -0,0424***  -0,0247*  0,0528***  0,0873 
mortgage funds  -0,0187***  -0,0688***  -0,0478***  -0,0029  0,0094 
balanced funds  -0,1362***  -0,1858***  -0,0594***  0,0435***  0,0818*** 
fixed income funds  -0,1333***  -0,1991***  -0,0296*  0,1158***  0,1401*** 
convertible funds  -0,0272***  -0,0430***  0,0087  0,0226*  0,0483*** 
*** 99% significance level, **98%significance level, *95%significance level 
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